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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

DELORES PETERSON,

Plaintiff,
vs.
~ALT

)

I

Case No. 7419

LAKE CITY,

Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from the order of the District Court
sustaining a general demurrer to the plaintiffs second amended
complaint. The complaint seeks damages for personal injuries
received because of defective sidewalks. Plaintiff alleges in
her second amended complaint that on the 14th day of November, 1947, she stepped in a hole in the sidewalk and fell down,
causing personal injuries (R. 16). Before commencing her
3
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action and on the 4th day of December, 1947, plaintiff filed
a claim with the Mayor and City Commission of Salt Lake City
for damages. A copy of the claim was attached to the complaint as Exhibit "A" (R. 19) . The claim was not verified
as is required by Section 15-7-76, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
Thereafter on or about the 27th day of May, 1948, the plaintiff
amended her claim by adding a verification. This verified
claim was filed with the City Commission on the 27th day of
May, 1948 (R. 17). A copy of the amended claim is attached
to the complaint at Exhibit "B" (R. 20).
The only difference between the claim which was filed
on December 4, 1947, and the amended claim which was filed
on May 27, 1948, is that the last claim was verified, whereas
the first was not.
Thus a claim was filed with the City Commission in time,
to-wit, within 30 days after the happening of the accident on
November 14, 1947 (R. 15). This claim gave the City all
of the detail which is required by Section 15-7-76, Utah Code
Annotated, but it was not verified. Thereafter the claim was
amended by adding a verification, but the amendment was
made after the thirty days provided for by Section 15-7-76
had expired.
The narrow question thus presented is, "May a cla:r-.
which is filed within time but which is not verified be amended
by adding a verification after the thirty days has expired?"
The complaint alleges these facts. A general demurrer
was filed, and a motion was made to strike the amended com·
plaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted

4
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the motion to strike. It entered a judgment of dismissal.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The Court erred in sustaining demurrer and holding that
the claim could not be amended.
ARGUMENT

I

I
I

I

I. It is proper to amend a claim by adding a verification
after the 30 day period provided by statute has expired.
As far as our research discloses, there has never been a
square holding on this point in Utah. The Utah courts have
held that the ·filing of a claim within the time prescribed by
Section 15-7-76 is a prerequisite to suit. See Hamilton vs.
Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P. (2d) 1028, Brown vs. Salt
Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. (2d) 570, Hurley vs. Town of
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213. ·
The court has also held that the failure to verify the
claim will be a bar to an action against the City. See Hamilton
vs. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P. (2d) 1028, and Moran
vs. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407.

I

;

There can be no doubt in view of these cases that the claim
must be filed within thirty days, and that it must be verified.
The cases do not hold, however, that the verification can not
be added after the thirty days has expired, as was done in
this case. This court has held on numerous past occasions
that the purpose of this statute was to give the City prompt
and detailed information concerning a claimed defect in the
sidewalk and of the happening of an accident, so that the City
could investigate it before the claim became stale. See .l\1ackay

5
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vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah, 247, Husband vs. Salt Lake City,
92 Utah 449, 69 P. (2d) 491. That purpose has been completely fulfilled by the cfaim filed here.

Contention is made by the :motion to strike that the description of the place of the accident was not given with sufficient particularity, so that investigating officers could locate
the alleged defect. Reference to the claim (R. 20) shows
that it describes the place as being on Fourth South Street between Eighth and Ninth West Streets. It also recites that the
plaintiff was walking west toward her home. The hole is
described as "a corner triangle," and of "triangular shape,
extending approximately one foot in toward 'the center of the
sidewalk and one foot along the north side of the sidewalk."
Certainly from this description of the hole, any investigating
officer could have located it. It is true that it does not specify
which side of the street the sidewalk was on, but it placed it
within one block, and the detailed description of the hole anc
the location from the north side of the sidewalk would make
it possible for any investigator to find the hole without resorting
to extrinsic evidence.
In this regard the case of Connar vs. Salt Lake City, 28
Utah 248, is directly in point. There the defect was described
as being on "First West between Seventh and Elghth South."
The City contended that this was insufficient but the court held
to the contrary. Since the_ description used in that case and
in this one are identical, that case would appear to be controlling.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the detail given
in the claim as to the date of the accident, its place, etc., fully

6
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complied with the requirements of the statute. It also appears
that this information was given to the City within approximately fifteen days of the date of the accident. Insofar as
prompt notice is concerned, the purpose of the statute, as
outlined in cases like Husband vs. Salt Lake City, was adequately fulfilled. From the form of the claim there can be no
doubt that it was intended to be a claim, and that it was designed
to and did give the information required by the statute.
The requirement of the statute that the claim be verified
could only have as its purpose the assurance that the City not
be required to consider claims unless the claimant were willing
to swear to the truthfulness of the matter set forth in the
claim. So said the court in White vs. Heber City, 82 Utah 547,
26 P. (2d) 333. There is no reason why this verification must
be promptly made. If the City is given prompt notice of all
of the things required by the statute within the time required,
it can complete its investigation early. Once this is done the
need for haste is past and there is no reason why the verifica- tion cannot come at a later date. Insofar as pleadings are
concerned, our court has held on numerous occasions that the
addition of a verification is purely a formal matter and the
, law has been very liberal in permitting verifications to be added.
See Ruffatti vs. Society Anonyme, 10 Utah 386, at 397, 37 P.
591, West Mountain Lime and Sandstone Company vs. Danky,
38 Utah 218, 111 P. 647.
Also in the case of W7 hite vs. Heber City, 82 Utah 547,
26 P. (2d) 333, the court held that it was not necessary under
the provisions of Section 15-7-76 that the verification contain all
the formalities of the verification of a complaint. The court said
7
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that the main purpose of the statute was to give the city prompt
notice. The court then noted that the st,atute also required the
claim to be "properly verified," but in the claim filed, the only
thing that had been done was to subscribe the claim before a
notary public. The court held this to be sufficient.
'l;'he White case a~so involved an amended claim. In the
_White case the original claim, properly verified, was filed
within the thirty days period. Thereafter an amended claim
was filed. The amended claim set forth many different and
new matters which had not been embodied in the original claim,
and the Court held that it did not constitute an amended claim
but was in fact a new claim. The Court said:
"We find it unnecessary to determine the point made
that an amended claim may not be filed after the statutory period-thirty days after the happening of the injury or the damage. While the point is urged by the
City, yet little is said about it and no cases are cited
in support of the contention."
The court thus said it was not determining the question
of whether or not an amended claim could be filed after the
thirty day period had expired, but affirmed the ruling rejecting
the second claim "on the ground that it may not be regarded
as the filing of an amended claim."
The co:urt thus rejected the claim, not becaus-e an amended
claim could not be filed after the thirty days had expired, but
.because the_ c~aim filed was in fact a new and different claim,
rath~r than an .amended claim. The White case treats the
ques#on qf rpaking amendments as an open question and
expressly refuses to decide it. There is no case which we have
8
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been able to locate where an attempt has been made to amend
a claim by adding a verification after the thirty day period has
expired. We have searched both the Utah cases and the cases
from states with similar statutes.

If the matter is a question of first impression for this court,
(and we submit that it is) then it would seem that the court
should construe the statute as permitting an amendment of
the claim by adding a verification after the thirty days expired.
The "main purpose" of the statute has been defined by the
Court as being to require prompt notice to be given to the City.
This has been fully complied with~ as in the White case. The
requirement that it be verified is undoubtedly for the purpose
of giving the City the benefit of a statement under oath. This
also has been complied with. The first purpose of the statute,
to-wit: prompt notice, can only be fulfilled by submission of
a claim within thirty days. The second purpose, to-wit: a verification, can be given after the thirty days has expired without
any prejudice to the City. Section 15-7-76 Does Not Lift a
Governmental Immunity, But is a Statute of Limitations Placed
on the General Liability of the City for Defective Streets.

In recent cases, the Supreme Court has stated that Utah
is committed to the doctrine that maintenance of streets and
sidewalks by cities is a governmental function. See Niblock
vs. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P. (2d) 800, Hamilton
vs. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 362, 106 P. (2d) 1068. There are
other Utah cases to the same effect. All of them are based upon
a statement by the Utah court made in the case of Hurley vs.
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 222 P. 231. In the Hurley case the
court states:

9
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"The right to institute an action in this class of case
is purely statutory. It did not exist at common law,
and therefore the conditions precedent fixed by the
statute which confers the right must be complied with
or the action fails. Berger vs. Salt Lake City, supra."
It thus is to be observed that the Hurley case makes the
statement that the action for damages occasioned by a defec~
tive street is purely statutory. No case is _cited as authority
for that statement. The Hurley case then states that conditions
precedent fixed by the statute rrwhich confers the right" must
be complied with. In support of this last statement, the Utah
case of Berger vs. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 190 P. 233, is
cited. The Berger case is authority for the proposition that
conditions precedent to suit prescribed by statute must be complied with. The Berger case, however, does not say nor hold
that a suit for damages because of defective sidewalks is a
right granted by statute, nor is it authority for the proposition
that the maintenance of streets and sidewalks is purely a governmental function. The Berger case merely states that the
overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect "that it is
within the power of the Legislature to impose such conditions
upon the right to sue cities and towns, which are merely arms
of the state government, as in its judgment may seem wise and
proper, and that the conditions which are thus imposed are
conditions precedent and cannot be ignored, either by the
claimants or by the courts."
The Berget case, therefore, recognizes that the right to
sue the City fot defects in the sidewalks always existed even
at the common law, and that the statute is but a restriction
imposed on that right. The Berger case says that these restrictions placed or imposed by statute on the right to bring
10
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the action. are conditions precedent to the bringing of a suit.
It. then says that these conditions precedent must be complied
with. The Be1'ger case is correctly cited by the Hudey case,
insofar as the rule that conditions precedent to suit must be
complied with are concerned. It is so cited that it might appear
to be given as authority for the preceding principle stated in
the Hurley case, to-wit: That the right to sue the city for defective sidewalks is purely statutory. To this extent the Hurley
case is misleading, and if it was intended in the Hurley case
to cite the Berger case as authority for the proposition that
the right to sue the City for defective streets was a right given
by statute, then it does not correctly cite the Berger case. Every
case coming down from the Utah court thereafter simply cites
the case of Hurley vs. Bingham as authority for the proposition
that the maintenance of streets is a governmental function, and
that the right to sue the City is purely statutory.
The cases thus holding in Utah are all without any authority behind them. The matter has never been carefully considered and clearly appears to have developed along this line,
because of a mis-statement made in the case of Hurley vs.
Bingham, which statement stands without any authority to
support it. The Hurley case merely makes those statements,
and then citing the Berger case, gives the impression that the
Berger case is authority for both statements which are made.
In reality, the Berger case sustains the second statement, to-wit:
that conditions precedent must be complied with, but is not
authority for the first statement, to-wit: that the right to sue
the city for defective sidewalks is purely statutory. In this
manner, Utah departed at a relatively late date ( 1924), from
nearly seventy years of consistent decisions to the effect that
11
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the maintenance of streets and sidewalks was a proprietary
function and that the right to sue for such defective streets was
a common law right. Statutes which were the forerunners of
Section 15-7-76 were thus merely limitations on the right of
action against the City, and it is error to construe the statute
as though it were a lifting of a governmental immunity and
a granting of a right of action where none had previously
existed.
The case of Berger vs. Salt Lake City on page 408 cites
the Utah cases and says that they are in harmony with the overwhelming weight of authority, which is to the effect that "it
is within the power of the Legislature to impose conditions
upon the right to sue cities and towns." The Berger case thus
speaks of the statute as the limitation on the general right to
sue the city, rather than a lifting of the governmental immunity. The case of Dahl vs. Salt Lake City, 45 .Utah 544,
146 P. 622, (w!J.ich is referred to in the Berger case) shows
that the court again treated the statute as imposing "conditions
upon which suits may be brought and maintained." In the
case of Sweet vs. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 Pac. 1167,
the court again speaks of the statute as a condition imposed
upon the right to sue the city. Reference in particular is made
to page 315 where the court speaks of the right of the Legislature to impose conditions on the right to sue the city. These
cases correctly recognize the proposition that the right to sue
the city exists independent of statute, and that the statue is
simply limitation on that general right of suit. In earlier Utah
cases the nature of the City's obligation to maintain streets
and sidewalks is analyzed in detail, and the court concludes
correctly that the maintenance of streets and sidewalks is a
12
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proprietary rather than a governmental function.
cases to this effect need not be cited.

All of the

Before there was any statute like section 15-7-76, the Utah
Supreme Court had taken the position that the maintenance
of streets and sidewalks was a ministerial, rather than a governmental, function. In the early case of Hopkins vs. Ogden City,
5 Utah 390, Hopkins sued Ogden City for injuries incurred
because of a defective street. The Court said:
"The law gave to the City of Ogden the control of its
streets, and the right to repair them, and also the right
to lay its water-pipes beneath their surface. To accomplish these ends, it was authorized to collect taxes,
and, having this power, it was required, for the safety
of the traveling public, to keep its streets in repair,
etc. etc.''
From this case forward the court consistently applied the
rule that the city was liable for neglect of its streets and sidewalks. Hurley case, supra, without authority or legal reasoning to support it, held for the first time that the city was immune
from suit because the maintenance of sidewalks was a governmental function. The next case was Kiesel vs. 0 gden City,
8 Utah 237. The suit was brought for damages caused by a
defective -sewer. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. The
Court said:
"When authority is given the municipality to collect
taxes to construct and maintain sewers, it is its duty
to use all :reasonable diligence and care to keep them
so that their use will not injure private property."
The Court then quoted with approval from Dillon on
Municipal to the effect that a city is liable for negligence in
the ministerial duty of keeping sewers in repair.
13
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Numerous other cases to the same effect followed: Scot:i/le
vs. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60,39 P. 481, (for defective sidewalks); Dwyer vs. Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 521 (for defective
street); Scott vs. Provo City, 14 Utah 32 (defective sidewalk);
Johnson vs. Park City, 27 Utah 420, 76 P. 216 (defective sidewalk); Connor vs. Salt Lake City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (defective street).
By the Revised Statutes of 1898, Sec. 312, persons claiming
damages against a city for defective streets and sidewalks were
required to file claims. This section was considered in Mackay
vs. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 247, 81 P. 81, but the court did not
even suggest that this section was a lifting of a governmental
immunity from suit. Nor could it have correctly so held.
Numerous suits against cities had been successfully brought
before the statute was enacted. All had predicated liability
on the .common law liability of cities for functions which were
ministerial in anture. All had held that the duty to maintain
streets and sidewalks was purely ministerial. The statute requiring the filing of claims was correctly considered to be the
imposition of limitations on the pre-existing liability of the
city for defective sidewalks. Thus in the Mackay case the
court based liability on the common law duty of a -~iry to
maintain its streets. The court said:
"When a city takes charge of bridge, and asserts control and ownership over it, there is sufficient reason
for holding it bound to keep the bridge in repair."
The statute requiring a claim is treated as a limitation
imposed on this general liability.
In Bowman vs. Ogden City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561, the
14
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court held that the city could waive the requirements of the
statute by acting upon an improper claim-and further that
the city had done so in that case. This holding that a city
could waive the requirements of the statute also negatives the
idea that the statute lifted the governmental immunity.
Later in Sweet vs. Salt Lake City, supra, and Dahl vs. Salt
Lake City, supra, the court considered the statute and again
expressly noted that the statute was the imposition of limitation on the right to sue a city. There was thus an unbroken
line of cases beginning in Volume 5 of the Utah reports and
continuing through to the case of Burley vs. Bingham, in Volume
63 of the Utah reports th<r court correctly held that cities were
liable for defective sidewalks because the maintenance thereof
was a ministerial function. Then in the Hurley case, without
citing any authority and without any discussion the court went
off in the exactly opposite direction. Thereafter the Utah cases
simply cited the Hurley case as authority. The matter has thus
never been considered by the Utah court and the reason for its
departure from its prior- consistent holdings was never given.
The· question of whether the liability of the city is based
upon its common law duty to keep the streets in repair is only
of importance in the construction of Section 15-7-76. In recent bases the Utah Court has said that this section must be
strictly construed because the statute grants a right of suit where
none previously existed. We have demonstrated by the Utah
cases cited above that the maintenance of sidewalks is a ministerial function, not a governmental one. The right of action
for injuries received from defective sidewalks existed at the
common law. Sectoin 15-7-76 was a limitation on that general

15
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right. Since it is a limitation, the rule of strict construction
should not be applied. If the rule of strict construction is not
applied, then it would seem that the amended claim in this
case should have been held to be allowed. The city was given
notice as required by the statute within the 15 days after the
injury. The verification was purely a functional matter. The
city in no way could be prejudiced by the tardy adding of the
verification. It is upon this basis that it is respectfully understood that the decision of the lower court could be revoked.

CONCLUSIONS:
A claim containing all of the information required by the
statute was mailed within the thirty days allowed by law. The
only claim deficiency in it is the claim that it did not sufficiently
describe the location of the difficulty. The description is in the
exact language of the description in Connar vs. Salt Lake City,
and that description was held to be sufficient. The main purpose
of the statute was to give the information to the city promptly.
The purpose was adequately fulfilled. The verification was
late but ther~ was no reason for requiring that the verification
be given within thirty days. Since the statute is the imposition
of limitations on all pre-existing general right of suit, it is not
necessary to construe the statute strictly. Therefore, the court
should hold that the adding of a purely formal matter such as
a verification could be done by amendment of the claim after
the thirty days has expired.
Respectfully submitted,

SHIELDS & SHIELDS &
EDWARD CLYDE
16
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